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Johnson v. Mountaire Farms of 
Delmarva: MARYLAND FAILS 
TO EXPAND WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSA nON ACT 
Recently, the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land declined to take part in a trend occur-
ring in a minority of jurisdictions, towards 
the expansion of the "exclusive remedy" ex-
ceptions under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act (Act). Md. Ann. Code, art. 10 1 
(1985). In Johnson v. Mountaire Farms of 
Delmarva, Inc., 305 Md. 246, 503 A.2d 
708 (1986), the court held that the inten-
tional tort exception to the Act requires an 
actual, specific and "deliberate intention" 
of the employer to injure an employee. Id. 
at 258,503 A.2d at 712. In so holding, the 
court affirmed the Circuit Court for Somer-
set County's decision to dismiss a wrong-
ful death and survivorship action brought 
against an employer, by the estate of an 
employee, who was killed during the course 
of employment. 
In Johnson, Rodney Adams, a sixteen 
year old employee of Mountaire Farms of 
Delmarva, Inc. (Mountaire), was electro-
cuted while at work. The electrocution oc-
curred as Rodney was "using a sump pump 
to remove liquid chicken fat and water from 
a ground depression." !d. at 248, 503 A.2d 
at 709. Approximately two months prior 
to this accident, Mountaire had been cited 
by the Maryland Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (MOSHA), for a 
"serious violation" under article 89, §40(b) 
of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1979). 
A "serious violation" is defined by the stat-
ute as a condition existing in which "there 
is a substantial probability that death or 
serious physical harm could result .... " 
Johnson, at 248, 503 A.2d at 709, n.1; Md. 
Ann. Code art. 89, §40(b) (1979). Mount-
aire was issued this citation because of the 
defective condition of the sump pump 
which ultimately caused the electrocution. 
The pump's extension cord cover was 
broken and its wires exposed. Also, the 
cord was improperly spliced and the plug 
was missing a ground prong. Soon after 
MOSHA issued the citation, Mountaire 
deliberately misinformed MOSHA that 
they had corrected the serious violation. 
Thereafter, on June 3, 1981, Rodney was 
electrocuted. 
On January 17, 1983, Rodney's mother, 
Nancy Johnson, individually and as per-
sonal representative of the estate of her 
son, filed a wrongful death and survivor-
ship action against Mountaire. Mrs. J ohn-
son alleged: 
(1) that the deliberate intention excep-
tion of Art. 101, §44 does not require 
the allegation or proof of the employer's 
actual intent to injure, but requires 
only that the employer intentionally 
do the act which happens to cause in-
jury or death; and (2) thatthe deliberate 
intention exception includes willful, 
wanton, or reckless conduct under-
taken with a knowledge and apprecia-
tion of a high degree of risk to another. 
Johnson, at 254, 503 A.2d at 712. 
Mountaire filed a special plea request-
ing dismissal of the action arguing that the 
allegations in the claimant's declaration 
did not satisfy the requirement of"deliber-
ate intention to injure" as required under 
§44 of the Act. !d. at 248,503 A.2d at 709. 
On January 31, 1984, Judge Simpkin, of 
the Circuit Court for Somerset County, 
filed a Memorandum Opinion agreeing 
with Mountaire and dismissed the case on 
May 23, 1984. Johnson appealed to the 
court of special appeals and also filed a 
petition for writ of certiorari in the court 
of appeals. The court of appeals granted 
certiorari prior to consideration by the in-
termediate appellate court. 
In her appeal, Johnson requested the 
court to adopt the view that something less 
than actual specific intention, on the part 
of an employer to injure an employee, is 
required to satisfy the deliberate intention 
requirement of §44 of the Act. This sec-
tion states in pertinent part that: 
[i]f injury or death results to a work-
man from the deliberate intention of 
his employer to produce such injury 
or death, the employee ... shall have 
the privilege either to take under this 
article, or have a cause of action against 
the employer, as if this article had 
never been passed. 
Johnson alleged that a showing of gross, 
wanton or reckless negligence, and that the 
employer provided an unsafe workplace 
was sufficient under the Act. In support of 
this proposition, Johnson cited decisions 
from West Virginia and Ohio. 
In Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc., 
161 W.Va. 695,246 S.E.2d 907 (1978), the 
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
held that an employee could sue his em-
ployer for damages when the employers 
conduct, which causes injury or death, was 
"willful, wanton and reckless ... " Johnson, 
at 253,503 A.2d at 711, citing, Mandolidis, 
246 S.E.2d at 914. The Ohio Supreme 
Court in Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron 
Chemicals, Inc., 69 Ohio St.2d 608, 433 
N.E.2d 572 (1982), held that an employer 
could be held liable to an injured employee 
in tort if the employer knew or should have 
known that an employee may be injured as 
a result of unsafe work conditions. John-
son, at 253, 503 A.2d at 711. 
In declining to expand Maryland's in-
tentional tort exception to the exclusivity 
rule under the Act, the court first looked to 
the history and legislative intent of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. The court 
noted that the first legislation in Maryland 
designed to compensate injured employees 
was passed by the Maryland General As-
sembly in 1914. The Workmen's Compen-
sation Act was designed to strike a "bal-
ance between workers and employers ... 
[whereby] [w]orkers lost their right to sue 
their employers for negligence but gained 
the right to quick and certain compensation 
for injuries sustained during the course of 
their employment, regardless offault." Id. 
at 250, 503 A.2d at 710. On the other 
hand, the employer's liability is limited in 
exchange for losing the "defenses of con-
tributory negligence, assumption of risk 
and the fellow servant rule." Id. 
The court further explained that § 15 of 
the Act outlines the employer's duties and 
liabilities in the event that an employee is 
disabled or killed from an accidental in-
jury arising out of and in the course of his 
employment. This section of the Act states 
that "[t]he liability prescribed by ... [this 
Act] shall be exclusive ... " Maryland An-
notated Code, article 101 §15 (1985). In 
interpreting the Act, the court held that 
aside from the exclusions under the Act 
itself, the remedies under the Act are ex-
clusive of all other remedies. 
Finally, the court held that Rodney's 
death did not fall within any exceptions 
under the Act. The court found that under 
§44 there must be a deliberate intention 
on the part of the employer to injure the 
employee. The court went on to state that 
the vast majority of jurisdictions define 
"deliberate intention" under workmen's 
compensation statutes as requiring specific 
intention to cause death or injury, coupled 
with some action to accomplish this result. 
Johnson, at 252, 503 A.2d at 711; citing, 
2A A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Com-
pensation, §68.13 (1983); Restatement 
(2nd) of Torts, §500 Comment F (1965); 
Prosser and Keeton on Torts, §8 (5th ed. 
1984). In adopting the majority view, the 
court held that Johnson had failed to allege 
sufficient facts to fall within the exception 
of §44, and thus the wrongful death and 
survivorship actions were properly dis-
missed. 
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Although the court's decision in Johnson 
is in line with the majority of other state 
holdings, it is at odds with the slowly de-
veloping current trend. In fact, on May 31, 
1985, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that §44 of the Act allows an employee 
to hold his employer's insurer liable under 
the theory of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress resulting from the actions of 
the insurer. Young v. Hartford Accident & 
Indemnity, 303 Md. 182, 492 A.2d 1270 
(1985); see also Gallagher v. Bituminous 
Fire and Marine Insurance Company, 303 
Md. 201,492 A.2d 1280 (1985). Johnson 
seems to put an end to any further expand-
ing of the exclusive remedy exceptions un-
der the Act. In Maryland, as in the major-
ity of jurisdictions, without a showing of 
a "deliberate intention" to injure an em-
ployee, an employer will not be held liable 
outside of the Act, no matter how grossly 
negligent he might be. The end result in 
Johnson was that Rodney Adams' estate, 
because Rodney had no dependents, could 
only recover medical and funeral expenses. 
-Stephen A. Markey, III 
u.s. V. 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft: 
COURT UPHOLDS THIRD PARTY 
FORFEITURE UNDER 21 U.S.C. 
§881 
In U.S. v. 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft, 777 
F.2d 947 (4th Cir. 1985), the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit fol-
lowed precedents from the Second, Fifth 
and Eleventh Circuits to hold that the use 
of an airplane to transport conspirators to 
the scene of a drug deal exposes that vehicle 
to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. §881 (1982). 
The court further held that an airplane 
owned by an uninvolved third party was 
subject to forfeiture because of his "con-
scious indifference." !d. at 952. 
In early 1983, an informant in Greenville, 
South Carolina contacted the Drug Enforce-
ment Agency (DEA) about a possible co-
caine sale. The informant was directed to 
negotiate a buy and a DEA surveillance op-
eration began. The informant arranged a 
deal with Brown and Montgomery to buy 
ten kilograms of cocaine for $500,000. In 
late February, Montgomery flew to Ft. 
Lauderdale, Florida to meet with Gerant 
and Butler, the cocaine suppliers, and 
Coddington, a middleman, to negotiate the 
purcnase. After weighing the cocaine and 
checking its purity, Montgomery flew back 
to Greenville. 
Gerant and Coddington then flew a 1966 
Beechcraft from Ft. Lauderdale to South 
Carolina. There was circumstantial evi-
dence suggesting that the Beechcraft car-
ried the ten kilograms of cocaine. Butler 
flew a 1969 Aerostar from Ft. Lauderdale 
to South Carolina with a passenger, Hanna. 
All parties involved in the deal met at a 
Howard Johnson's and eventually all were 
. arrested, with the exception of Coddington, 
who escaped. In addition to recovering the 
cocaine from an automobile, a search of 
the hotel rooms revealed an electric money 
counter, a microscope, several guns, $4,960 
in cash and a marijuana cigarette. A search 
of the Beechcraft revealed documents in-
dicating that Gerant and Butler were on 
the plane in the Bahamas three months 
earlier. 
Under authority granted by 21 U.S.C. 
§ 881 (b)( 4), law enforcement officers seized 
the two airplanes once it was determined 
they were used to promote the drug trans-
action. Forfeiture proceedings against To-
tal Time Aircraft, Inc., the owner of the 
Beechcraft, and Sundance Air, Inc., the 
owner of the Aerostar, were instituted in 
federal district court. The consolidated 
cases were tried without a jury and the dis-
trict court ruled both aircraft were subject 
to forfeiture. Sundance Air is a Florida 
corporation wholly owned by Gerant. The 
district court determined that by trans-
porting two drug conspirators, Gerant was 
utilizing the corporation's plane to assist in 
the illegal act of selling cocaine. Therefore, 
the Aerostar was used to "facilitate the 
sale, transportation, possession or conceal-
ment of cocaine" which the corporation 
was aware of through its owner and was 
subject to forfeiture. Id. at 949. 
Total Time, is also a Florida corporation 
owned by David and Virgil Seeright. Total 
Time allowed Gerant touse the Beechcraft 
on several occasions, including the trip to 
South Carolina. The district court found 
that the Beechcraft transported the cocaine 
on this particular trip, concluding that it 
was used to further the "sale, transporta-
tion, possession or concealment" of cocaine 
in violation of21 U.S.c. §881(a)(4). It fur-
ther found that David Seeright, the corpo-
ration's president, did not inquire into the 
"purpose of the trip, or what cargo would 
be carried, required no signed contract, 
had no clear understanding as to when the 
plane would be returned, and received no 
money for its use." Id. at 950. In addition, 
a flight plan was not filed and there was no 
insurance on the plane. The district court 
concluded that Total Time did nothing to 
guard against the illegal use of its plane, 
and therefore, was not an "innocent owner" 
within the meaning of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Calero- Toledo v. Pearson Yacht 
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